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Forcing People to Choose Is Paternalistic 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
ABSTRACT 
It can be paternalistic to force people to choose. Often people do 
not wish to choose, but both private and public institutions ask or 
force them to do so, thus overriding their wishes. As a result, people’s 
autonomy may be badly compromised and their welfare may be 
greatly reduced. These points have implications for a range of issues 
in law and policy, suggesting that those who favor active choosing, 
and insist on it, may well be overriding people’s preferences and val-
ues, and thus running afoul of John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle (for 
better or for worse). People have limited mental bandwidth, and forc-
ing choices can impose a hedonic or cognitive tax. Sometimes that tax 
is high. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When you enter a taxicab in a large city, and ask to go to the airport, 
you might well be asked this question: “What route would you like me to 
take?” 
If you are like many people, you will not welcome that question.  You 
might even hate it.  After all, it is the business of the driver to know how to 
get to the airport, and in any case the driver almost certainly has access to a 
GPS device.  For you, the question – asking you to choose – is a kind of 
mental tax, cognitive for sure (because of the need to think) and possibly 
 
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.  I am grateful to Thomas 
Lambert and the editors of the Missouri Law Review for hosting a superb conference 
on nudging and libertarian paternalism in October 2016; the discussions much informed 
my treatment here.  Special thanks to Bruce Ackerman, a terrific commentator and col-
league for several decades, for suggesting, back in 2014, that I produce this essay.  It 
took a while. 
 
Thanks too to Elizabeth Emens, Eric Johnson, George Loewenstein, Eric Posner, Ric-
cardo Rebonato, Lucia Reisch, and Adrian Vermeule for valuable comments on a pre-
vious draft.  I am also grateful to participants in a legal theory workshop at Yale Law 
School and to audiences at Dartmouth College for excellent suggestions and to Mat-
thew Lipka for superb comments and research assistance.  I have drawn on previous 
presentations and some of the material presented here appears, in earlier form, in 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE: UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF 
CHOICE (2015); the goal of this essay is to present a simple, significantly clarified and 
revised, expanded, self-contained version of one argument in that book. 
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hedonic as well (because it is not exactly pleasant to ponder how to get to the 
airport).  To be sure, the tax is likely to be small.  But it might well be un-
welcome. 
Whenever a doctor or a lawyer asks a battery of questions to a patient 
or a client, a possible reaction might be: “On some of these questions, why 
don’t you decide for me?”  If the emotional stakes are high, and if the issues 
are difficult, the hedonic and cognitive tax might be very high.  And when-
ever public officials require people to fill out complex forms to qualify for 
training or for benefits, the tax might turn out to be prohibitive, at least for 
some people.  It might lead them not to apply at all.  It is for this result that 
complex form-filling requirements are not merely a paperwork burden; they 
can undermine and even undo the underlying programs.  Form-filling can be 
a curse. 
In this light, consider three problems: 
 
1. An online clothing company is deciding whether to adopt a system 
of default settings for privacy, or whether to require first-time users 
to specify, as a condition for access to the site, what privacy settings 
they would prefer. 
 
2. A large employer is deciding among three options: (1) to enroll em-
ployees automatically in a health insurance plan; (2) to ask them to 
opt in if they like; or (3) to say that as a condition for starting work, 
they must indicate whether they want health insurance, and if so, 
which plan they want. 
 
3. A utility company is deciding whether to adopt for consumers a 
“green default,” with a somewhat more expensive but environmen-
tally preferable energy source, or instead a “gray default,” with a 
somewhat less expensive but environmentally less desirable energy 
source –  or alternatively, to ask consumers which energy source 
they prefer. 
 
In these cases, and countless others, a public or private institution, or an 
individual, is deciding whether to use some kind of default rule or instead to 
require people to make some kind of active choice.  (I shall say a good deal 
about what the word “require” might mean in this setting.)  For those who 
reject paternalism and who prize freedom of choice, active choosing has ev-
ident appeal.  Indeed, it might seem far preferable to any kind of default rule.  
It respects personal agency; it promotes responsibility; it calls for an exercise 
of individual liberty.  It seems to reflect a commitment to human dignity. 
In light of these considerations, many people might argue that active 
choosing deserves some kind of pride of place, especially if it is accompanied 
by efforts to improve or “boost” people’s capacities, perhaps by providing 
2
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them with information, perhaps by increasing their statistical literacy.1  In 
social science parlance, the best approach might be to strengthen System 2, 
the deliberative system of the mind, rather than to ignore it, or to exploit or 
enlist System 1, the automatic or intuitive system.2 
In recent years, there have been vigorous debates about freedom of 
choice, paternalism, behavioral economics, individual autonomy, and the use 
of default rules and choice architecture.3  Invoking recent behavioral find-
ings, some people (including the present author) have argued that because 
human beings err in predictable ways, and cause serious problems for them-
selves, some kind of paternalism is newly justified, especially if it preserves 
freedom of choice, as captured in the idea of “nudging” or “libertarian pater-
nalism.”4  Consider a GPS device, which nudges; perhaps we need GPS de-
vices everywhere.  Others contend that because of those very errors, some 
form of coercion is needed to promote people’s welfare.  They believe that 
as a result, the argument for choice-denying or nonlibertarian paternalism is 
strengthened.5 
These claims have been sharply contested.  A possible response is that 
public officials are prone to error as well, and hence an understanding of be-
havioral biases argues against paternalism, not in favor of it.6  If government 
makes mistakes, it might nudge people in the wrong direction; it might also 
have an insufficient appreciation of diversity within the relevant population.  
The “knowledge problem,” rightly emphasized by Hayek, potentially affects 
all decisions by government,7 and behavioral findings seem to compound that 
 
 1. See Till Grüne-Yanoff & Ralph Hertwig, Nudge Versus Boost: How Coherent 
Are Policy and Theory?, 26 MIND & MACHINES 149, 156–59 (2016). 
 2. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2011). The idea 
of two “systems” is controversial in some circles and nothing here depends on accept-
ing that idea. 
 3. See, e.g., NUDGE THEORY IN ACTION: BEHAVIORAL DESIGN IN POLICY AND 
MARKETS (Sherzod Abdukadirov ed., 2016); SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: 
JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM (2013); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 
(2008); Ryan Bubb & Richard Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and 
Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 (2014); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conserva-
tives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1211 (2003); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and 
Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
1033 (2012); Riccardo Rebonato, A Critical Assessment of Libertarian Paternalism 
(Oct. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2346212. 
 4. See Camerer et al., supra note 3, at 1214; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Tha-
ler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). 
 5. See CONLY, supra note 3; Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1659. 
 6. See NUDGE THEORY IN ACTION: BEHAVIORAL DESIGN IN POLICY AND 
MARKETS, supra note 3, and Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 133 (2006), for a variety of arguments to this effect. 
 7. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
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problem because they suggest that identifiable biases will accompany sheer 
ignorance.8  The emerging field of “behavioral public choice” draws attention 
to that possibility.9  Consider the problem of behavioral bureaucrats: public 
officials who are not only adversely affected by the standard behavioral bi-
ases (such as present bias and availability bias) but also subjected to the pres-
sure imposed by well-organized private groups with a significant stake in the 
outcome.10  If behavioral bureaucrats suffer from the knowledge problem, it 
is all the more important to constrain them. 
It might also be objected that on grounds of both welfare and autonomy, 
active choosing is desirable even if people have a tendency to err.11  People 
can learn from their own mistakes, and that might be quite important.  On 
this view, people should be asked or allowed to choose, whether or not they 
would choose rightly.  For all sides, the opposition between paternalism and 
active choosing seems stark and plain, and indeed it helps to define all of the 
existing divisions. 
My central goal here is to unsettle that opposition and to suggest that it 
is often illusory.  The central reason is that people often choose not to 
choose,12 and forcing them to choose is a kind of tax. In many contexts, in-
sisting on active choosing, or forcing people to choose, is a form of paternal-
ism, not an alternative to it.  Under imaginable assumptions, any effort to 
require active choosing easily fits within the standard definition of paternal-
ism and runs afoul of the most conventional objections to paternalism.  Many 
people believe, in many contexts, that choosing is burdensome and costly. 
Sometimes they choose not to choose explicitly (and indeed are willing to 
pay a considerable amount to people who will choose for them).  They have 
actively chosen not to choose. 
Sometimes people have made no explicit choice; they have not actively 
chosen anything.  But it is nonetheless reasonable to infer that in particular 
contexts, their preference is not to choose, and they would say so if they were 
 
 8. See Jan Schnellenbach & Christian Schubert, Behavioral Public Choice: A 
Survey 18 (Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics, No. 14/03, 2014), 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/92975/1/777865785.pdf. 
 9. See id. at 2. 
 10. An early discussion is Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades 
and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999). 
 11. See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 3. 
 12. An important clarification: My focus throughout is not on “not choosing,” 
which involves no choice at all, and which is different from choosing not to choose, in 
the sense of choosing someone else to choose on one’s behalf.  One might not choose 
because (for example) of procrastination or because one wants to retain option value.  
See Ziv Carmon, Klaus Wertenbroch & Marcel Zeelenberg, Option Attachment: When 
Deliberating Makes Choosing Feel Like Losing, 30 J. CONSUMER RES. 15, 25–26 
(2003).  There is, of course, an overlap between the two phenomena: People might 
decline to choose because they are busy, do not want to take responsibility, or think 
that they might err.  But choosing not to choose is a form of choice, and those who want 
to avoid choosing might be as averse to that choice as any other. 
4
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asked.  (Recall the case of the cab ride to the airport, or the interaction with 
a doctor or a lawyer.)  They might fear that they will err.  They might be busy 
and lack “bandwidth,”13 and so they have limited cognitive resources and do 
not want them to be taxed.  They might want to focus on some concerns but 
not others; they might think that choosing would deny them that freedom.  
They might be aware of their own lack of information14 or perhaps their own 
behavioral biases (such as unrealistic optimism15).  They might find the un-
derlying questions confusing, difficult, painful, and troublesome – empiri-
cally, morally, or otherwise.  They might not enjoy choosing.  They might 
not want to take responsibility for potentially bad outcomes for themselves 
(and at least indirectly for others).16  They might anticipate their own regret 
and seek to avoid it.17 
But even when people prefer not to choose, many private and public 
institutions favor and promote active choosing on the ground that it is good 
for people to choose.  They may have sufficient reasons for that belief.  Some-
times active choosing is required as a way of overcoming a collective action 
problem (people cannot delegate the right to vote), but sometimes it is a 
means of protecting those who choose not to choose against their own mis-
take(s).  The central idea is that people should be choosing whether or not 
they want to do so.  An institution might think that choice-making builds 
some kind of muscle; it might think that it helps people to learn.  To the extent 
that the institution’s preference for choice-making overrides that of the  
 13. See SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO 
LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH 39–66 (2013). 
 14. On the effects of lack of information in producing abstention, see Tom Coupé 
& Abdul G. Noury, Choosing Not to Choose: On the Link Between Information and 
Abstention, 84 ECON. LETTERS 261 (2004). 
 15. See TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS: A TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY 
POSITIVE BRAIN 16–17 (2011). 
 16. For a demonstration, see Björn Bartling & Urs Fischbacher, Shifting the 
Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility, 79 REV. ECON. STUD. 67 (2012).  On peo-
ple’s preference for flipping a coin, as a way of avoiding responsibility, see Nadja 
Dwenger, Dorothea Kübler & Georg Weizsäcker, Flipping a Coin: Theory and Evi-
dence (2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.wzb.eu/sites/de-
fault/files/%2Bwzb/mp/vam/flipping_2014-01-21.pdf.  Consider this suggestion: 
 
[The] cognitive or emotional cost of deciding may outweigh the benefits that 
arise from making the optimal choice.  For example, the decision-maker may 
prefer not to make a choice without having sufficient time and energy to think 
it through.  Or, she may not feel entitled to make it.  Or, she may anticipate a 
possible disappointment about her choice that can arise after a subsequent res-
olution of uncertainty.  Waiving some or all of the decision right may seem 
desirable in such circumstances even though it typically increases the chance of 
a suboptimal outcome. 
 
Id. at 1 
 17. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 51–54 (1980). 
5
Sunstein: Forcing People to Choose
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
648 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
chooser (who prefers not to choose), active choosing counts as paternalistic.  
It overrides people’s own judgments about what is good or what best pro-
motes welfare or freedom. 
To be sure, nanny states forbid choosing, but they also forbid the choice 
not to choose.  Choice-promoting or choice-requiring paternalism might be 
attractive forms of paternalism, but neither is an oxymoron, and they are pa-
ternalistic nonetheless. 
If people are required to choose even when they would prefer not to do 
so, active choosing counts as a species of nonlibertarian paternalism in the 
sense that people’s own choice is being rejected.  We shall see that in many 
cases, those who favor active choosing are actually mandating it, and may 
therefore be overriding (on paternalistic grounds) people’s choice not to 
choose.18  When people prefer not to choose, required choosing is a form of 
coercion – though it may be a justified form, at least where active choosing 
does not impose high taxes, when it does not increase the likelihood and mag-
nitude of errors, and when it is important to enable people to learn and to 
develop their own preferences.  One strand of the liberal political tradition 
emphasizes the importance of self-development; forcing people to choose can 
be counted as perfectionist (in the liberal sense) and in a sense as unabashedly 
paternalistic.19 
If, by contrast, people are asked whether they want to choose and can 
opt out of active choosing (in favor of, say, a default rule), active choosing 
counts as a form of libertarian paternalism.  In some cases, it is an especially 
attractive form.  A company might ask people whether they want to choose 
the privacy settings on their computer, or instead rely on the default, or 
whether they want to choose their electricity supplier, or instead rely on the 
default. 
With such an approach, people are being asked to make an active choice 
between the default and their own preference, and in that sense, their liberty 
is fully preserved.  Call this simplified active choosing.  Simplified active 
choosing has the advantage of avoiding the kinds of pressure that come from 
a default rule,20 while also allowing people to rely on such a rule if they like.  
In the future, we should see, and we should hope to see, adoption of this 
approach by a large number of institutions, both public and private. 
But that approach is no panacea.  It imposes a tax of its own, even if the 
tax is small.  It is important to acknowledge that whenever a private or public 
institution asks people to choose, it might be overriding their preference not 
 
 18. There is an irony here in light of evidence that people sometimes place an 
excessive value on choice, in the sense that their preference for choice leads to welfare 
losses.  See Simona Botti & Christopher K. Hsee, Dazed and Confused by Choice: How 
the Temporal Costs of Choice Freedom Lead to Undesirable Outcomes, 112 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 161 (2010). 
 19. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). 
 20. See Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Decisions by Default, in THE 
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 417, 417–27 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013) 
(discussing impact of defaults). 
6
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to do so, and in that sense engaging in choice-requiring paternalism.  This 
point applies even when people are being asked whether they want to choose 
to choose.  (The passenger must focus her attention even if a cab driver 
merely asks, “Do you want to tell me how to go, or would you like it better 
if I choose the route on my own?”) After all, they might not want to make 
that second-order choice (and might therefore prefer a simple default rule). 
If the point is not obvious, consider the fact that any question – in person, by 
email, by regular mail – that demands an answer is in effect a tax on people’s 
scarce cognitive resources. 
In this sense, there is a strong nonlibertarian dimension to apparently 
liberty-preserving approaches that ask people to choose between active 
choosing and a default rule.  If these claims do not seem self-evident, or if 
they appear a bit jarring, it is because the idea of active choosing is so famil-
iar, and so obviously appealing, that it may not be seen for what it is: a form 
of choice architecture, and one that many choosers may dislike, at least in 
settings that are unfamiliar or difficult.21 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows.  Part II explores 
how, and in what settings, active choosing might be required.  Part III, the 
heart of the Article, discusses choice-requiring paternalism and shows that it 
can be a serious problem and that it is not a contradiction in terms.  It explains 
that when people choose not to choose, active choosing counts as a form of 
paternalism, one that runs into both welfare-based and autonomy-based ar-
guments in favor of freedom of choice (including the choice not to choose).  
This point holds even for simplified active choosing, though the standard ob-
jections to paternalism are weakened as applied to that approach.  Part IV 
concludes. 
II. VARIETIES OF CHOICE 
Is government untrustworthy?  Always?  Many of those who embrace 
active choosing believe that consumers of goods and services, and indeed 
choosers of all sorts, should be free from government influence.22  Of course 
they recognize that in markets, producers will impose influences of multiple 
kinds, but they contend that when third parties are not affected, and when 
force and fraud are not involved, the government itself should remain neutral.  
They reject paternalism on government’s part.23  Perhaps it is legitimate for 
public officials to require the provision of accurate information, so as to en-
sure that consumers’ choices are adequately informed.  Perhaps reminders 
 
 21. A valuable discussion is presented in Barbara H. Fried, But Seriously, Folks, 
What Do People Want?, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (2013).  For discussion that bears on 
whether choice-promoting or choice-requiring paternalism is justified, see Cass R. Sun-
stein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2013), and in particular the discussion 
of learning over time.  Id. at 44–45, 49–52. 
 22. This is the general thrust of Rebonato, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
 23. Id.; Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1063–66. 
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are justified as well. But some people think that if government seeks to 
“nudge”24 people in its preferred directions in other ways – by imposing de-
fault rules or embracing paternalism of any kind – it is exceeding its appro-
priate bounds.  In particular, they prefer active choosing, and they want to 
encourage it.  And even if their focus is on the public sector, they might say 
the same thing for the private sector as well. 
 
A. Three Possibilities 
But what does active choosing entail?25  What does it mean to “require” 
people to indicate their preferences?  The question is more difficult than it 
might seem.  Those who insist on the inevitability of default rules will object 
that it has no clear answer.  Even if choice architects seek to promote active 
choosing, they have to specify what happens if people simply refuse to 
choose.  Isn’t the answer some kind of default rule? 
The question is a good one, because some kind of default rule is ulti-
mately necessary.  Choice architects have to establish what happens if people 
decline to choose – a point that critics of nudging often miss.  Choice archi-
tecture itself is inevitable.  But this point should not be taken to collapse the 
distinction between active choosing and default rules.  To see why, consider 
three possibilities. 
(1) Criminal or civil punishment for those who refuse to make an active 
choice.  In most contexts, no one contends that if people fail to make a choice, 
they should be killed, imprisoned, fined, or otherwise punished.  The sanction 
for that failure is that they do not receive a good or service (see (2) and (3) 
below).  But there are exceptions.  In some nations, including Australia, Bel-
gium, and (before 1970) the Netherlands, people have been subject to civil 
sanctions if they fail to vote,26 and in that sense they may be punished for 
refusing to make an active choice.  So too, a provision of the Affordable Care 
Act requires people to obtain health insurance, subject to punishment (in the 
form of a tax penalty) if they fail to do so.27  If people are required to obtain 
health insurance, they will normally be required to choose which plan to ob-
tain. 
 
 24. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3. 
 25. I am understanding the term in a purely formal sense, to capture a response to 
a question about what one prefers.  It would be possible to understand “choosing” in a 
more functional sense, to capture deciding for reasons, as distinguished from simply 
“picking,” which is akin to tossing a coin.  For an important discussion, see Edna 
Ullmann-Margalit & Sidney Morgenbesser, Picking and Choosing, 44 SOC. RES. 757, 
757–58 (1977).   As I understand it here, active choosing includes “picking” and can 
occur even when people lack an antecedent preference.  See id. at 758. 
 26. Lisa Hill, Low Voter Turnout in the United States: Is Compulsory Voting a 
Viable Solution?, 18 J. THEORETICAL POL. 207, 208 (2006). 
 27. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012).   
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With respect to active choosing, both of these cases do have a wrinkle: 
People are being forced to choose along one dimension (for whom to vote 
and which health insurance plan to obtain), but are being prohibited from 
choosing along another dimension (whether to vote or to obtain health insur-
ance).  But insofar as one kind of choice is being required, we may fairly 
speak of coerced choosing.  In both of these cases, coerced choosing can be 
justified as a means of overcoming a collective action problem: The demo-
cratic system might be jeopardized unless most or all adults are voting, and 
perhaps a health insurance system requires very broad participation.   
But we could easily imagine an effort to defend both forms of coercion 
on simple paternalistic grounds.  For example: To protect themselves against 
disaster, people should be required to purchase health insurance.  And to en-
sure that people have the right health insurance plan, people should be re-
quired to make a personal choice about what plan they should have.  (To be 
sure, the second form of paternalism reflects a form of respect for individual 
agency that the first form of paternalism does not display.  But on plausible 
assumptions, both forms make sense, and they do not really contradict each 
other.) 
We could also imagine other contexts in which people would face sanc-
tions if they do not choose, though admittedly some such cases look more 
like science fiction than the real world.  For realistic examples, consider cases 
in which people must decide whether to become organ donors (or face crim-
inal penalties) or must choose privacy settings on their computers (subject to 
civil sanctions if they do not).  The fact that sanctions are rarely imposed on 
people who choose not to choose seems to suggest an implicit recognition 
that in a free society, such choices are generally acceptable and indeed a le-
gitimate part of consumer sovereignty.  One reason involves information: 
People know best what they want, and others should not choose for them, 
even if the choice is not to choose.28  I will press this point, which has been 
insufficiently emphasized by those who claim to prize individual choice. 
(2) Active choosing with respect to a related or ancillary matter as a 
condition for obtaining a good or a service (or a job).  Sometimes active 
choosing is mandatory in a distinctive sense: Unless people make an active 
choice on some matter, they cannot obtain a good or service, even though 
that good or service, narrowly defined, is not the specific topic of the choice 
that they are being asked to make.  We can imagine a continuum of connec-
tions between the matter in question, for which an active choice is being re-
quired, and the specific good that has already been chosen.  There would be 
a close connection if, for example, people were told that unless they indicate 
their preferences with respect to car insurance, they cannot lease a car.  So 
too, there would be a close connection if people were told that unless they 
 
 28. For a powerful demonstration, see JOEL WALDFOGEL, SCROOGENOMICS: WHY 
YOU SHOULDN’T BUY PRESENTS FOR THE HOLIDAYS (2009), which shows that even 
family members and close friends make large mistakes in choosing gifts for people 
during the holiday season. 
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create a password, or indicate their preferences with respect to privacy set-
tings, they cannot use their computer.  And indeed, both of these cases are 
standard.  In markets, sellers sometimes insist that purchasers must make an 
active choice on some related matter in order to obtain or use a product. 
By contrast, there would be a somewhat weaker connection if people 
were informed that they could not work with a particular employer until they 
have indicated their preferences with respect to their retirement plan.  The 
connection would be weaker still if people were told that they could not ob-
tain a driver’s license unless they indicate their preferences with respect to 
organ donation.  The connection would be even weaker if people were told 
that they could not register to vote unless they have made a choice about their 
preferred privacy settings on their computer. 
In the final example, there is no connection between the matter on which 
people are being asked to make a choice and the good that they are specifi-
cally seeking.29  In some cases, the choice architect is requiring an active 
choice on a matter that is genuinely ancillary.  Note that in imaginable cases 
that fall in this category, the requirement of active choosing has a strongly 
coercive dimension insofar as the good in question is one that people cannot 
easily reject (such as a driver’s license, a job, or a right to vote).  The choice 
architect is, in effect, leveraging that good to ensure an active choice on some 
other matter. 
From the normative point of view, we might want to distinguish be-
tween public and private institutions here.  Perhaps private institutions, dis-
ciplined as they are by market forces, should freely compete along this di-
mension as along others, and perhaps public institutions should hesitate be-
fore requiring people to choose, unless there is a close connection between 
the good or service in question and the object of active choice. 
(3) Active choosing among goods, services, or jobs as a condition for 
obtaining a good, a service, or a job.  For most consumption decisions, peo-
ple are given a wide range of options, and they can choose one or more of 
them, or none at all.  Unless they make a choice, they will not obtain the 
relevant good or service.  They are not defaulted into purchasing sodas, tab-
lets, cell phones, shoes, or fishing poles.  Indeed, this is the standard pattern 
in free markets.  When people visit a website, a restaurant, or a grocery or 
appliance store, they are generally asked to make an active choice.  The de-
fault – understood as what happens if they do nothing – is that no product 
will be purchased.  People do not receive goods or services unless they have 
actively chosen them.  The same point holds for the employment market.  
People are not typically defaulted into particular jobs, at least not in any for-
mal sense.  They have a range of options, and unless they take one, they will 
 
 29. The case of organ donations is different.  In 2007, for example, motor vehicle 
accidents accounted for about twenty percent of all organ donations.  See Stacy Dickert-
Conlin, Todd Elder & Brian Moore, Donorcycles: Motorcycle Helmet Laws and the 
Supply of Organ Donors, 54 J.L. & ECON. 907, 912 (2011). 
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be unemployed.  In this respect, free markets generally require active choos-
ing. 
There is nothing inevitable about this situation.  We could imagine a 
situation in which sellers assume, or presume, that people want certain prod-
ucts, and in which buyers obtain them, and have to pay for them, passively.  
Imagine, for example, that a bookseller has sufficient information to know, 
for a fact, that Johnson would want to buy any new book by Harlan Coben, 
Richard Thaler, or Joyce Carol Oates, or that Smith would like to purchase a 
new version of a particular tablet, or that Smith would want to buy a certain 
pair of sneakers, or that Ullmann would like to purchase a particular product 
for his dog, or that when Williams runs out of toothpaste, he would like new 
toothpaste of exactly the same kind.  If the sellers’ judgments are unerring, 
or even nearly so, would it be troublesome and intrusive, or instead a great 
benefit, for them to arrange the relevant purchases by default?  Existing tech-
nology is increasingly raising this question.30 
There is a good argument that the strongest reason to require active 
choosing is that sufficiently reliable predictive shopping algorithms do not 
(yet) exist, and hence active choosing is an indispensable safeguard against 
erroneous purchases, and so use of algorithms are not (yet) in the interest of 
those who might be denominated purchasers (by default).  On this view, the 
argument for active choosing is rooted in the view that affirmative consent 
protects against mistakes – which leaves open the possibility of “passive pur-
chases” if and when a reliable technology becomes available.  We are getting 
there, and for some things we may already be there, but so long as such tech-
nology does not exist, passive purchases would be unacceptable.  A hypoth-
esis: Once reliable algorithms are indeed in place, we will see far more sup-
port for their use in cases like those of Johnson, Smith, Ullmann, and Wil-
liams. 
It is true that markets require a background set of entitlements, estab-
lishing what people have and do not have, before they begin to choose; the 
background entitlements are given rather than chosen, and they might reflect 
a form of paternalism.31  For example, people might have some kind of “de-
fault entitlement” to be free from age discrimination, which they can waive 
for a price;32 some entitlements of this kind (such as the right to be free from 
discrimination on the basis of race and sex) are not waivable.33  Because peo-
 
 30. See Greg Bensinger, Amazon Wants to Ship Your Package Before You Buy It, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2014, 3:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/01/17/amazon-
wants-to-ship-your-package-before-you-buy-it/?mod=e2tw. 
 31. Cass R. Sunstein, Choosing Not to Choose, 64 DUKE L.J. 1, 16 (2014). 
 32. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2012). 
 33. See, e.g., Brooklyn Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945) (holding that 
employees may not waive their rights to the minimum wage or overtime pay under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19). 
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ple’s preferences may be affected by decisions about background entitle-
ments,34 a form of paternalism may be difficult or perhaps impossible to 
avoid insofar as some person or institution is making those decisions.35  If 
people’s preferences are an artifact of entitlements, we cannot select entitle-
ments by asking about those preferences.  But with background entitlements 
in place, people usually do not obtain goods or services unless they have ac-
tively chosen them (putting gifts to one side). 
B. What Choosers Choose 
As the examples suggest, both private and public institutions might 
choose (2) or (3), though of course only government can choose (1).  It should 
be clear that active choosing is far from inevitable.  Instead of imposing ac-
tive choosing, an institution might select some kind of default rule, specifying 
what happens if people do nothing.  Of course (2) and (3) also come with a 
kind of default rule: Unless people make an active choice, they will have no 
good, no service, and no employment.  But other approaches are possible. 
For example, those who obtain driver’s licenses might be defaulted into 
being organ donors, or those who start work with a particular employer might 
be defaulted into a specific retirement or health care plan.  These examples 
are not hypothetical.  Alternatively, those who make an active choice to pur-
chase a particular product – say, a book or a subscription to a magazine – 
might be enrolled into a program by which they continue to receive a similar 
product on a periodic basis, whether or not they have made an active choice 
to do that.  The Book of the Month Club famously employs a strategy of this 
sort.36 
An active choice to purchase a product might also produce a default rule 
that is unrelated to the product – as, for example, where purchase of a partic-
ular book created default enrollment in a health care plan, or where an active 
choice to enroll in a health care plan created default enrollment in a book 
club.  In extreme cases, where disclosure is insufficiently clear, an approach 
of this kind might be a form of fraud, though we could also imagine cases in 
which such an approach would actually track people’s preferences. 
Suppose, for example, that a private institution knows that people who 
purchase product X (say, certain kinds of music) also tend to like product Y 
(say, certain kinds of books).  Suggestions of various kinds, default adver-
tisements, default presentations of political views, and perhaps even default 
purchases could be welcome and in people’s interests, unfamiliar though the  
 34. See Keith M. Marzilli Ericson & Andreas Fuster, The Endowment Effect (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19384, 2013), www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w19384. 
 35. I am bracketing the possibility that entitlements are a product of a “spontane-
ous order” of some sort, rather than of any kind of decision. See generally Edna 
Ullmann-Margalit, Invisible-Hand Explanations, 39 SYNTHESE 263 (1978). 
 36. See Peter Bowal, Reluctance to Regulate: The Case of Negative Option Mar-
keting, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 377, 378–79 (1999). 
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link might seem.  For example, the website Pandora tracks people’s music 
preferences, from which it can make some inferences about likely tastes and 
judgments about other matters, including politics.37 
We could also imagine cases in which people are explicitly asked to 
choose whether they want to choose.38  Consumers might be asked: Do you 
want to choose your cell phone settings, or do you want to be defaulted into 
settings that seem to work best for most people, or for people like you?  Do 
you want to choose your own health insurance plan, or do you want to be 
defaulted into the plan that seems best for people in your demographic cate-
gory?  In such cases, many people may well decide in favor of a default rule, 
and thus decline to choose, because of a second-order desire not to do so.  
They might not trust their own judgment; they might not want to learn.  The 
topic might make them anxious.  They might have better things to do. 
Simplified active choosing – active choosing, with the option of using 
a default – has considerable promise and appeal, not least because it avoids 
at least many of the influences contained in a default rule,39 and might there-
fore seem highly respectful of autonomy while also giving people the ability 
to select the default.  For cell phone settings or health insurance plans, active 
choosers can choose actively if they like, while others can (actively) choose 
the default. 
Note, however, that this kind of question is also an intrusion and a kind 
of tax.  For that reason, it is not a perfect solution, at least for those people 
who genuinely do not want to choose.  After all, they are being asked to do 
exactly that.  (One more time: “Do you want to choose your route to the air-
port?” asked the taxi driver.)  At least some of those people likely do not want 
to have to choose between active choosing and a default rule, and hence they 
would prefer a default rule to an active choice between active choosing and 
a default rule.  Even that active choice takes time and effort, and imposes 
costs, and some or many people might not want to bother.  In this respect, 
supposedly libertarian paternalism, in the form of an active choice between 
 
 37. For evidence to this effect, see Natasha Singer, Listen to Pandora, and It Lis-
tens Back, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/technol-
ogy/pandora-mines-users-data-to-better-target-ads.html?hpw&rref=technol-
ogy&_r=2&, and consider in particular: “During the next federal election cycle, for 
instance, Pandora users tuning into country music acts, stand-up comedians or Christian 
bands might hear or see ads for Republican candidates for Congress.  Others listening 
to hip-hop tunes, or to classical acts like the Berlin Philharmonic, might hear ads for 
Democrats.” 
 38. See Bartling & Fischbacher, supra note 16, at 84, which shows that people 
will often say “yes,” other things being equal, thus supporting the conclusion that deci-
sion rights have intrinsic value.  We can agree with that conclusion while also asserting 
that in some cases, the intrinsic value will be outweighed by the instrumental value of 
delegation (as, for example, where people believe they will err or where people are 
busy). 
 39. See Rebonato, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
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active choosing and a default, itself has a strong nonlibertarian dimension – 
a conclusion that brings us directly to the next topic. 
III.  CHOICE-PROMOTING PATERNALISM 
I now turn to the heart of my argument, which is very simple: Those 
who favor active choosing, and who force people to choose, are often acting 
paternalistically, at least if they are requiring choices in circumstances in 
which people would prefer not to choose.40  Because those circumstances are 
pervasive, those who require choices are, in the relevant sense, acting as pa-
ternalists.  Paternalism might be justified, here as elsewhere; but choice-pro-
moting paternalism may intrude on autonomy, welfare, or both.  It may run 
into the same objections that are made against paternalism of the more famil-
iar kinds.  As we shall see, however, choice-promoting paternalism also has 
a distinctive defense. 
A. Paternalism, Welfare, Autonomy 
Is active choosing paternalistic when people would prefer not to choose?  
To answer that question, we should start by defining paternalism.  There is 
of course an immensely large literature on that question.41  Let us bracket the 
hardest questions and note that while diverse definitions have been given, it 
seems clear that the unifying theme of paternalistic approaches is that a private 
or public institution does not believe that people’s choices will promote their 
welfare, and it is taking steps to influence or alter people’s choices for their 
own good.42  
What is wrong with paternalism, thus defined?  Those who reject pater-
nalism typically invoke welfare, autonomy, or both.43  They tend to believe that 
individuals are the best judges of what is in their interests, and of what would 
promote their welfare, and that outsiders should decline to intervene because 
 
 40. Recall here a qualification noted in the text: If choice architects are seeking to 
solve a collective action problem, and requiring a choice for that reason, they are not 
acting paternalistically.  Paternalism is involved if and when the goal is to force people 
to choose because choosing is in people’s best interests, even if they do not see things 
that way. 
 41. See, e.g., PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Christian Coons & Michael 
Weber eds., 2013); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 
(1988). 
 42. For a valuable and relevant discussion, bearing particularly on means pater-
nalism, see B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference: 
Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics, 124 Q.J. ECON. 51 
(2009).  For an illuminating discussion of what is wrong with paternalism, see Nicolas 
Cornell, A Third Theory of Paternalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1295 (2015). 
 43. Rebonato, supra note 3, is an especially helpful discussion. 
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they lack crucial information.44  Placing a bright spotlight on welfare, John 
Stuart Mill himself emphasized that this is the essential problem with outsiders, 
including government officials.  Mill insisted that the individual “is the person 
most interested in his own well-being,”45 and the “ordinary man or woman has 
means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by 
any one else.”46  When society seeks to overrule the individual’s judgment, it 
does so on the basis of “general presumptions,” and these “may be altogether 
wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual 
cases.”47  Mill’s goal was to ensure that people’s lives go well, and he con-
tended that the best solution is for public officials to allow people to find their 
own paths.48 
Mill offered an argument about welfare, grounded in a claim about the 
superior information held by individuals.  But there is an independent argument 
from autonomy,49 which emphasizes that even if people do not know what is 
best for them, and even if they would choose poorly, they are entitled to do as 
they see fit (at least so long as harm to others, or some kind of collective action 
problem, is not involved).  On this view, freedom of choice has intrinsic and 
not merely instrumental value.  It is an insult to individual dignity, and a form 
of infantilization, to eliminate people’s ability to go their own way.50 
B. Paternalists Who Force People to Choose 
Whether or not these objections to paternalism are fully convincing,51 
they have considerable force in many situations.  But there might seem to be 
legitimate questions about whether and how they apply to efforts to override 
the choices of people whose choice is not to choose.  Perhaps those who want 
people to choose are not acting paternalistically at all; perhaps they are seeking 
to promote self-determination and showing people a high level of respect. 
That is probably what they believe they are doing.  Recall the case of the 
taxi driver, who may be doing just that, and who may have passenger rage 
(“why did you choose that crazy route?”) and tips in mind.  Doctors and law-
 
 44. See F. A. HAYEK, THE MARKET AND OTHER ORDERS 384–86 (Bruce Caldwell 
ed., 2014). 
 45. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY 5, 76 (Stefan Collini ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1989) (1859). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 77. 
 48. See id. at 76–77; see also HAYEK, supra note 44, at 384–86. 
 49. For a recent version, see Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 3. 
 50. See Cornell, supra note 42, at 1314–18, for a valuable elaboration of this view.  
For an illuminating and skeptical discussion, suggesting that overriding choices need 
not entail a lack of respect, see CONLY, supra note 3, at 33–36. 
 51. For a detailed discussion, see CONLY, supra note 3; Cornell, supra note 42; 
and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?: THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 
(2014). 
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yers, asking patients and clients to choose, might be analogous.  If public offi-
cials promote or require choices, they might think that their own goal is to avoid 
any kind of paternalism.  Focusing on Mill’s concerns, or some variation on 
them, they might insist that respect for individual agency calls for a two-word 
proclamation: You choose.  What is paternalistic about that? 
On reflection, however, the objections to paternalism apply quite well, 
and so choice-promoting paternalism and choice-requiring paternalism are not 
oxymorons.  If an outsider tells people that they must choose, she is rejecting 
their own conception of what they should be doing, and so endangering their 
welfare (on Mill’s premises) and refusing to respect their autonomy.  People 
might decline to choose for multiple reasons.  Their choice not to choose is, in 
their view, the best way to promote their welfare, and they want that choice to 
be treated with respect.  They might have a kind of intuitive framework: They 
want to minimize decision costs and error costs.  When choosing would impose 
high decision costs (and in the sense amount to a cognitive or hedonic tax), 
they might not want to do it, except if incurring those costs is a good way to 
reduce error costs.  And if they think that someone (a cab driver, an employer, 
a public official52) would be more likely to make the right decision, they might 
think that the best way to reduce error costs is not to choose.  They might ef-
fectively appoint someone else as their agent; they might see themselves as the 
principal and delegate a choice to that agent with conviction, contentment, or 
pleasure. 
More particularly, they might believe that in the context at hand, they lack 
information or expertise.  They might fear that they will err.  They might not 
enjoy the act of choosing; they might like it better if someone else decides for 
them.  They might be too busy.53  They might not want to incur the emotional 
costs of choosing, especially for situations that are painful or difficult to con-
template (such as organ donation or end-of-life care).  They might find it a 
relief,54 or even fun, to delegate.  They might not want to take responsibility.55  
They might not want to pay the psychic costs associated with regretting their 
choice.56  Active choosing saddles the chooser with responsibility for the 
choice and reduces the chooser’s welfare for that reason. 
In daily life, people defer to others, including friends and family mem-
bers, on countless matters, and they are often better off as a result.  In ordinary 
 
 52. See Oren Bar-Gill & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulation as Delegation, 7 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 10 (2015). 
 53. See generally MULLAINATHAN & SHAFIR, supra note 13. 
 54. For related discussion, see Edna Ullmann-Margalit, On Not Wanting to Know, 
in REASONING PRACTICALLY 72, 78–79 (Edna Ullmann-Margalit ed., 2000). 
 55. See Dwenger, Kübler & Weizsäcker, supra note 16, for an emphasis on dele-
gation to a randomized process. 
 56. Thaler, supra note 17.  But see Jeffrey R. Brown, Anne M. Farrell & Scott J. 
Weisbenner, The Downside of Defaults 19–20 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 12-05, 2012), http://www.nber.org/aging/rrc/papers/orrc12-05.pdf (finding 
higher levels of regret in cases in which people went with a default rather than making 
an active choice). 
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relationships, people benefit from the functional equivalent of default rules, 
some explicitly articulated, others not.  Within a marriage, for example, certain 
decisions (such as managing finances or planning vacations) might be made by 
the husband or wife by default, subject to opt-out in particular circumstances.  
That practice has close analogues in many contexts in which people are dealing 
with private or public institutions and choose not to choose. They might want 
their rental car company, their health care provider, or their employer to make 
certain choices for them.  Indeed, people are often willing to pay others a great 
deal to make such choices.  But even when there is no explicit payment or grant 
of the power of agency, people might well prefer a situation in which they are 
relieved of the obligation to choose, because such relief will reduce decision 
costs, error costs, or both. 
Suppose, for example, that Jones believes that he is not likely to make a 
good choice about his retirement plan, that he does not want to be educated in 
order to be able to do so, and that he would therefore prefer a default rule, 
chosen by someone who is a specialist in the subject at hand.  In Mill’s terms: 
Doesn’t Jones know best?  Recall Mill’s insistence that the individual “is the 
person most interested in his own well-being,”57 and the “ordinary man or 
woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be 
possessed by any one else.”58 
Or suppose that Smith is exceedingly busy and wants to focus on her most 
important concerns, not on a question about the right health insurance plan for 
her, or even about the right privacy setting on her computer.  Doesn’t Mill’s 
argument support respect for Smith’s choice?  Recall Mill’s claim that when 
society seeks to overrule the individual’s judgment, it does so on the basis of 
“general presumptions,” and these “may be altogether wrong, and even if right, 
are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases.”59  Whatever the 
chooser chooses, the welfarist arguments seem to call for deference to the 
chooser’s choice, even if that choice is not to choose.  If we believe in freedom 
of choice on the ground that people are uniquely situated to know what is best 
for them,60 then that very argument should support respect for people when 
they freely choose not to choose. 
Or turn from welfare to considerations of autonomy and dignity.  Suppose 
that Winston, exercising her autonomy, decides to delegate decision-making 
authority to someone else, and thus to relinquish the power to choose, in a con-
text that involves health insurance, energy providers, privacy, or credit card 
plans.  Is it an insult to Winston’s dignity, or instead a way of honoring it, if a 
private or public institution refuses to respect that choice?  It is at least plausible 
to suppose that respect for autonomy requires respect for people’s decisions 
about whether and when to choose.61  That view is especially reasonable in 
 
 57. Mill, supra note 45, at 76. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 77. 
 60. See HAYEK, supra note 44, at 386. 
 61. See Cornell, supra note 42. 
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light of the fact that people are in a position to make countless decisions, and 
they might well decide that they would like to exercise their autonomy by fo-
cusing on their foremost concerns, not on what seems trivial, boring, or diffi-
cult.62 
But are people genuinely bothered by the existence of default rules, or 
would they be bothered if they were made aware that such rules had been cho-
sen for them?  We do not have a full answer to this question;63 the setting and 
the level of trust undoubtedly matter.  But note in this regard the empirical 
finding, in the context of end-of-life care, that even when they are explicitly 
informed that a default rule is in place, and that it has been chosen because it 
affects people’s decisions, there is essentially no effect on what people do.64  
This finding suggests that people are not uncomfortable with defaults, even 
when they are made aware both that choice architects have selected them and 
that they were selected because of their significant effect.65  There is increasing 
evidence that transparency about defaults does not decrease their effects.66 
 
C. Freedom and Its Alienation 
To be sure, we could imagine hard cases in which a choice not to choose 
seems to be an alienation of freedom.  In the most extreme cases, people might 
choose to be slaves or otherwise to relinquish their liberty in some fundamental 
way.67  In a less extreme case, people might choose not to vote, not in the sense 
of failing to show up at the polls, but in the sense of (formally) delegating their 
vote to others.  Such delegations are impermissible,68 perhaps because they 
would undo the internal logic of a system of voting (in part by creating a col-
lective action problem that a prohibition on vote-selling solves69), but perhaps 
 
 62. See Esther Duflo, Tanner Lectures on Human Values and the Design of the 
Fight Against Poverty (May 2, 2012) (available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/7904). 
 63. For relevant discussion, see Bar-Gill and Sunstein, supra note 52. 
 64. See George Loewenstein et al., Warning: You Are About To Be Nudged, 1 
BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 35, 37, 40 (2015). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Hendrik Bruns et al., Can Nudges Be Transparent and Yet Effective? 16–
17 (WiSo-HH Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 33, 2016), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2816227; Mary Steffel, Elanor F. Williams 
& Ruth Pogacar, Ethically Deployed Defaults: Transparency and Consumer Protection 
Through Disclosure and Preference Articulation, 53 J. MARKETING RES. 865, 872 
(2016). 
 67. For an overview, see Andrew Sneddon, What’s Wrong with Selling Yourself 
into Slavery? Paternalism and Deep Autonomy, 33 CRÍTICA: REVISTA 
HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFÍA 97 (2001). 
 68. See Steven Rieber, Vote Selling and Self-Interested Voting, 15 PUB. AFF. Q. 
35, 35 (2001). 
 69. The basic idea is that if vote-selling were permitted, voting power could be 
concentrated in individuals or individual entities, and while decisions to sell might be 
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also because individuals would be relinquishing their own freedom.  Or per-
haps people might choose not to make choices with respect to their religious 
convictions, or their future spouse,70 and they might delegate those choices to 
others.  In cases that involve central features of people’s lives, we might con-
clude that freedom of choice cannot be alienated and that the relevant decisions 
must be made by the individuals themselves. 
We cannot easily specify which cases fall in this category.71  People can 
have nice debates on that question.  But even if the category is fairly large, it 
cannot easily be taken as a general objection to the proposition that on auton-
omy grounds, people should be allowed not to choose in multiple domains. 
D. Asymmetries 
Choice-promoting paternalism is no oxymoron, but it might have a dis-
tinctive appeal, and along some dimensions, it is quite different from forms of 
paternalism that (1) do not promote choosing, (2) actively discourage choosing, 
and (3) forbid choice.  As a familiar example of (1), consider a default rule; as 
an example of (2), consider a warning or a reminder designed to persuade peo-
ple to delegate authority and not to choose on their own.  Examples of (2) are 
admittedly rare, but we could certainly imagine them in the domain of financial 
or medical choices.  Examples of (1) are, of course, common. Examples of (3) 
are also common and are the most standard target of those who reject paternal-
ism. 
Those who favor choice-promoting paternalism might acknowledge the 
plausibility of the phrase but object that we are really dealing here with a de-
bater’s point, even a kind of pun.  They might contend that their motivations 
are distinctly attractive, and that so long as choices are being promoted, the 
standard concerns about paternalism are weakened or even eliminated.  I have 
argued that those concerns are very much in play.  But those who favor active 
choosing might argue that they are not, in fact, showing disrespect to choosers 
or insulting them in any way;72 on the contrary, they are honoring them. 
They might add that their real concern is the welfare of choosers.  Alert 
to the risks of mistakes on the part of choice architects, who may be ignorant 
or biased, or neglectful of the importance of individual circumstances, they 
might claim to be the most faithful followers of Mill.  They might make that 
claim even as they acknowledge that some people choose not to choose.  To be 
sure, a decision to delegate the route to the airport to the cab driver might not 
 
individually rational, the result would be bad from the standpoint of a large group of 
vote-sellers.  See id. at 39. 
 70. For relevant discussion, see Amitrajeet Batabyal, On the Likelihood of Finding 
the Right Partner in an Arranged Marriage, 30 J. SOCIO-ECON. 273 (2001), and CONLY, 
supra note 3, at 183–84. 
 71. See CONLY, supra note 3, at 19–20. 
 72. See Cornell, supra note 42, at 1314–18. 
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be a mistake; but what about a decision involving one’s own medical care or 
financial situation? 
There are some fair points here.  No one doubts that those who do not 
want to choose might object to outsiders (intermeddlers?) who seek to influ-
ence or override their desire.  But it is true that choice-promoters do have dis-
tinctive motivations, associated with respect for choosers – which leads us to 
the question of justification. 
E. Justified Paternalism? Of Welfare and Autonomy 
(1) Welfare.  It is important to acknowledge that even if a chooser freely 
chooses not to choose, that particular choice might turn out not to be in the 
chooser’s interest (as the chooser would define it).  For that reason, choice-
promoting or even choice-requiring paternalism might have a welfarist justifi-
cation.  Perhaps the chooser chooses not to choose only because he lacks im-
portant information, which would reveal that the default rule might be harmful 
or that the choice architect is ignorant or untrustworthy.  Perhaps he suffers 
from some form of bounded rationality.  A behavioral market failure (under-
stood as a nonstandard market failure that comes from human error73) might 
infect a choice not to choose, just as it might infect a choice about what to 
choose. 
A non-chooser might, for example, be unduly affected by “availability 
bias” because of an overreaction to a recent situation in which his own choice 
went wrong.74  Or perhaps the chooser is myopic and is excessively influenced 
by the short-term costs of choosing, which might require some learning (and 
hence some investment), while underestimating the long-term benefits, which 
might be very large.75  A form of “present bias”76 might infect the decision not 
to choose.  People might face a kind of intrapersonal collective action problem, 
in which such a decision by Jones, at Time 1, turns out to be welfare-reducing 
for Jones at Times 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
But for those who reject paternalism on welfarist grounds, these kinds of 
concerns are usually a justification for providing more and better information 
– not for blocking people’s choices, including their choices not to choose.  Per-
haps choosers should be nudged to choose.  Choice-promoting paternalism, as 
a form of libertarian paternalism, might be preferred to choice-requiring pater-
nalism. 
On welfare grounds, the argument in favor of promoting or requiring 
choice-making is the same, in broad outline, as the argument for promoting or 
requiring any kind of behavior.  Of course, welfarists might be wrong to object 
 
 73. See Bar-Gill & Sunstein, supra note 52, at 4. 
 74. A good overview is Rolf Reber, Availability, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: 
INTRIGUING PHENOMENA IN THINKING, JUDGMENT AND MEMORY 185, 185–203 
(Rüdiger F. Pohl ed., 2017). 
 75. See Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, supra note 1. 
 76. For a summary, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 51, at 35–36. 
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to paternalism; we can easily imagine contexts in which paternalism is amply 
justified on welfare grounds.77  But with respect to their objections, the ques-
tion is whether the choice not to choose is, in general or in particular contexts, 
likely to go wrong, and in the abstract, there is no reason to think that that 
particular choice would be especially error-prone.  On the contrary: In light of 
people’s tendency to fall prey to overconfidence, the choice not to choose 
might even be peculiarly likely to be right, which would create serious prob-
lems for choice-requiring paternalism.78  At most, concerns about individual 
error would seem to support choice-promoting paternalism, not a more aggres-
sive variety. 
Consider in this regard evidence that people spend too much time trying 
to make precisely the right choice, in a way that leads to significant welfare 
losses.  In many situations, people underestimate the temporal costs of choos-
ing, and exaggerate the benefits, producing “systematic mistakes in predicting 
the effect of having more, versus less, choice freedom on task performance and 
task-induced affect.”79  If people make such systematic mistakes, it stands to 
reason that they might well choose to choose in circumstances in which they 
ought not to do so on welfare grounds.  And if choosing has intrinsic value, 
then people will choose in circumstances in which they would do better, at least 
in material terms, to make some kind of delegation.80 
My aim is not to endorse the welfarist rejection of paternalism; it is only 
to say that the underlying arguments apply to all forms of paternalism, includ-
ing those that would interfere with the decision not to choose.  To be sure, some 
welfarists are willing to interfere with people’s choices; they may well be lib-
ertarian or nonlibertarian paternalists.81  The simplest points are that the stand-
ard welfarist arguments on behalf of freedom of choice apply to those who 
(freely) choose not to choose and that those who want to interfere with such 
choices might well be paternalists.  Whether their paternalism is justified, on 
welfare grounds, depends on the context. 
(2) Autonomy.  We have seen that from the standpoint of autonomy, in-
terference with the choice not to choose is presumptively objectionable.  When 
cab drivers ask passengers to choose, they might be intruding on their passen-
gers’ autonomy; and when a passenger says, “you decide,” he is exercising his 
 
 77. See CONLY, supra note 3, at 100. 
 78. See Ulrich Hoffrage, Overconfidence, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: INTRIGUING 
PHENOMENA IN THINKING, JUDGMENT AND MEMORY, supra note 74, at 291–314.  For 
evidence that people like to choose even when they do not suffer from overconfidence, 
see Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez, Cass R. Sunstein & Tali Sharot, The Intrinsic Value of 
Choice: The Propensity to Under-Delegate in the Face of Potential Gains and Losses, 
54 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 187, 187–202 (2017).  The intrinsic value of choice will 
lead people to choose on their own, and not to delegate, even in circumstances in which 
delegation, and so not choosing, is economically preferable.  Choosers can be losers.  
Id. at 200.  
 79. Botti & Hsee, supra note 18, at 161. 
 80. See Bobadilla-Suarez, Sunstein & Sharot, supra note 78. 
 81. See CONLY, supra note 3. 
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autonomy.  It is respectful of choosers, and a recognition of their dignity, to 
allow them to devote their attention to those topics to which they want to devote 
their attention. 
As we have seen, the most obvious exceptions are those in which the 
choice counts as some kind of alienation of freedom.  But perhaps there are 
other exceptions, raising the question whether choice-promoting or choice-re-
quiring paternalism might often be justified on autonomy grounds.  An em-
ployer might believe that employees should choose their own health insurance 
plan so that their own capacity for agency is exercised and increased – not only 
with respect to health insurance plans, but with respect to a wide range of 
choices that call for statistical literacy.  For medical matters generally, it might 
be best to try to boost people’s capacities, perhaps by providing simple infor-
mation, perhaps by teaching statistical competence, with the thought that a suc-
cessful effort on that count will increase people’s autonomy in multiple do-
mains.  Similar considerations might support active choosing in the context of 
retirement plans.  The examples could easily be multiplied.82 
These points show that if the goal is to respect or promote autonomy, it is 
not always clear whether we should embrace or reject choice-promoting pater-
nalism.  On the one hand, people do exercise their autonomy by deciding when 
and whether to choose.  In fact, that is a fundamental way that autonomy is 
exercised.  That is a strong reason to reject choice-preserving paternalism.  On 
the other hand, choice-making is like a muscle, and it can be strengthened 
through use.  For choice architects, the most general suggestion is that on au-
tonomy grounds, people should be able to choose, or not choose, as they see 
fit, but that in some circumstances, the promotion of autonomy can itself justify 
influencing or overriding the choice not to choose – with the strength of the 
argument depending on the value, for autonomy, of promoting choice-making 
in the particular context. 
F. Cases 
In which cases would it count as paternalistic to reject a choice not to 
choose?  Begin with (1), above.83  Suppose that people are subjected to crim-
inal punishment if they do not choose (for example to vote or to purchase 
health care) and that they wish not to choose.  To know whether paternalism 
is involved, we need to specify the reason that people are being forced to 
choose.  If people face some kind of collective action problem and if coercion 
is meant to solve that problem, paternalism is not involved.  But if public 
officials believe that it is best for people if they choose, and if they are pun-
ishing people in order to ensure that they do what is best for them, then we 
do have a case of paternalism.  Everything turns on the reason for the pun-
ishment. 
 
 82. See GERD GIGERENZER, RISK SAVVY: HOW TO MAKE GOOD DECISIONS (2014). 
 83. See supra Part II.A. 
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Whether or not people should be forced to vote or to purchase health 
care, there is a plausible argument that in both contexts, the goal of coercion 
is to solve a collective action problem.  But we could easily imagine cases in 
which no such problem is involved and in which people are being forced to 
choose on the ground that it is good for them to do so, even if they think 
otherwise.  Some of those who support both compulsory voting and the “in-
dividual mandate” for health insurance believe exactly that.  In the latter con-
text, the idea might be that people suffer from inertia84 or fail to make a 
choice that will protect them in the event that things go unexpectedly wrong.  
Paternalism might be justified, but we should call it what it is. 
Now turn to (2), which seems to involve many of the most interesting 
cases.  In those cases, some choosers undoubtedly have a second-order pref-
erence not to choose, and active choosing interferes with or overrides that 
preference.  Nonetheless, choice architects are imposing a requirement of ac-
tive choosing in circumstances in which some or many people, faced with the 
option, would choose not to choose.  Is active choosing paternalistic for that 
reason? 
As before, the answer turns on why choice architects are insisting on 
active choice.  In the case of organ donation, paternalism is not involved.  
The goal is to protect third parties, not choosers. So too with a case in which 
a choice architect favors a default rule that reduces environmental harms; in 
such cases, third parties are at risk.85  But suppose that as a condition for 
entering into an employment relationship, people are asked or required to 
make an active choice with respect to their retirement plan; suppose too that 
choice architects believe that it is good for them to do so, even though pro-
spective employees disagree (and would prefer to be defaulted).  If so, then 
choice architects are acting paternalistically.  In such cases, those who insist 
on active choosing are hardly avoiding paternalism; they are engaging in it. 
It might seem puzzling to suggest that paternalism might be involved in 
(3).  How can it be paternalistic to say that you do not own a pair of shoes, a 
tablet, an automobile, or a fish sandwich unless you have actively chosen it?  
The question is a good one, but it should not be taken as rhetorical; everything 
depends on the reasons that underlie the creation of a particular system of 
choice architecture.86  To be sure, there are many justifications for free mar-
kets and active choosing, and most of the familiar ones have nothing at all to 
do with paternalism.  Some of those justifications speak of efficiency, others 
of welfare, and others of autonomy.  But suppose that we think that active 
choosing is a way to ensure that people develop certain characteristics and 
 
 84. See Punam Anand Keller et al., Enhanced Active Choice: A New Method to 
Motivate Behavior Change, 21 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 376, 377–78 (2011). 
 85. See Cass E. Sunstein & Lucia A. Reisch, Automatically Green: Behavioral 
Economics and Environmental Protection, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 127, 148–50 
(2014). 
 86. For a valuable discussion, see Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 35 and accompa-
nying text. 
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tastes.  Choosers may gain independence, self-sufficiency, and a sense of in-
itiative, and a system of active choosing (subject to background entitlements) 
may be desirable for exactly that reason.  That justification has some pater-
nalistic features insofar as it is based on the choice architect’s judgment about 
the kinds of characteristics that people should have, regardless of what people 
now want. 
This view is not exactly standard, but it is hardly foreign to those who 
emphasize the importance of freedom of choice; it plays a significant role in 
Mill’s own defense of liberty.87  It is also a cousin of an early defense of free 
markets, memorably sketched by Albert Hirschman, which emphasizes that 
free commerce creates a certain kind of culture, in which traditional social 
antagonisms, based on religion and ethnicity, are softened as people pursue 
their economic interests.88  For at least some of those who prize active choos-
ing, the concern is not softening of social divisions, but the development of 
engaged, spirited, informed people.  Those who favor active choosing often 
embrace a form of liberal perfectionism, embodied in the idea that the gov-
ernment legitimately promotes certain desirable characteristics, on the 
ground that it is best for people to have those characteristics.89  To the extent 
active choosing promotes independence, self-sufficiency, and a sense of ini-
tiative, it might be preferred on perfectionist grounds, even if people would 
choose not to choose. 
I have said that it is not exactly usual to see those who embrace free 
markets as favoring any kind of paternalism, and it is often wrong to see them 
in that way, because other justifications are available, and because people 
often do in fact have a first-order desire to choose, certainly in cases that fall 
in category (3).90  But suppose that private or public institutions favor active 
choosing, and reject mandates or default rules, because they want to influence 
people for their own good.  Recall our working definition, which suggests 
that paternalism is involved when a private or public institution does not be-
lieve that people’s choices will promote their welfare, and it is taking steps to 
influence or alter people’s choices for their own good.  If people have a second-
order desire not to choose, and if active choosing overrides that choice, then 




Choice can be either a great benefit, a kind of gift, or instead an immense 
burden, a kind of curse.  It is reasonable for people not to be pleased when a 
 
 87. See Mill, supra note 45. 
 88. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL 
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977). 
 89. See RAZ, supra note 19.  Liberal perfectionism is criticized by JOHN RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
 90. See Ernst Fehr, Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, The Lure of Authority: Moti-
vation and Incentive Effects of Powers, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1325 (2013). 
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cab driver asks them to specify their preferred route to the airport; it is also 
reasonable for people to want a delegate to make choices with respect to com-
puter settings, medical tests and treatments, health insurance plans, and retire-
ment plans.  In evaluating private and public institutions, and people’s diverse 
attitudes toward freedom of choice, it is crucially important to appreciate their 
frequent desire to choose91 and also their frequent antipathy toward choosing.  
If either is neglected, there is a risk that both low-level policy judgments and 
high-level theoretical claims will go badly wrong. 
Many people have insisted on an opposition between active choosing and 
paternalism, but the opposition is illusory, even a logical error.  The reason is 
that some people choose not to choose, or would do so if they were asked.  It 
is true that the power to choose may well have intrinsic value, but people often 
exercise that power by delegating authority to others.  Nanny states forbid peo-
ple from choosing, but they also forbid people from choosing not to choose.92 
If choice architects are overriding the choice not to choose, they are acting 
paternalistically –  at least if they are motivated by the belief that active choos-
ing is good, and that people should be choosing, notwithstanding the fact that 
people reject that belief.  Insistence on active choosing may simultaneously 
reduce people’s welfare and insult their autonomy.  The same concerns that 
motivate objections to paternalism in general can be applied to paternalistic 
interferences with people’s choice not to choose.  At least as a presumption, 
that choice deserves respect, even if outsiders wish that it were otherwise. 
   
 
 91. For data, see Bobadilla-Suarez, Sunstein & Sharot, supra note 78, at 193–97. 
 92. On their reasons for doing so, see Sunstein, supra note 21, at 52, and in par-
ticular the discussion of learning over time.  Id. at 44–45, 49–52. 
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